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DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA 
This paper discusses the use of debt-for-nature swaps as a 
funding mechanism for environmental expenditures in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The pros and cons of such transactions for creditor banks, 
environmental groups and debtor countries are discussed and 
evaluated in terms of their ability to address environmental 
problems prevalent in the region. It is concluded that the 
usefulness of debt swaps may be limited and that direct donations 
to developing countries for environmental purposes may often be 
superior to swap transaction. 
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA 
Steven C. Kyle* 
Introduction 
Debt-for-nature swaps (DNS) are transactions in which a 
country's foreign currency debt is exchanged for environmental 
expenditures within the country or for the creation of nature 
parks, preserves, or development limits in fragile areas. Swaps 
have received a great deal of attention since first being suggested 
as a funding mechanism in 1984. The reason for this popularity is 
the fact that DNS's appear to address two problems simultaneously: 
high and rising levels of foreign debt, and the environmental 
crisis afflicting many developing countries. This paper discusses 
the pros and cons of DNS's vis-a-vis other funding mechanisms for 
addressing the environmental problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
most recent DNS took place in Madagascar in August 1990' and many 
environmentalists in the u.S. and elsewhere have promoted 
additional transactions in other parts of Africa, making it 
important to assess the extent to which this mechanism can be used 
effectively. 
The existence of serious debt repayment problems for many 
African countries is clear. Though most of these countries are not 
* Steven Kyle is an Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 
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responsible for the bulk of the overall international debt crisis ­
the amounts owed by most Sub-Saharan countries are small in 
comparison both to the world financial system and to the debts of 
Latin American and East European countries the foreign 
indebtedness of many African countries has grown to the point where 
repayment is difficult or impossible. One important cause of this 
decline in ability to service debt is the decline in commodity 
prices that occurred through the 1980's. countries dependent on 
exports of unprocessed agricultural or mineral products have 
suffered a sharp drop in foreign receipts as a result. 
The existence of serious environmental problems is also clear. 
Table 1 shows a recent estimate of the loss of wildlife habitat in 
Africa over recent years. It is evident that the problem of 
widespread degradation of land is not confined to the more obvious 
examples such as desertification in the Sahel, but extends across 
various agro-climatic zones to affect virtually all countries to 
some degree. 
Various reasons have been cited for the accelerated rate of 
degradation. One major problem is the reliance of a large 
percentage of the population on fuelwood for cooking and other 
household energy needs. This has resulted in large areas of 
completely denuded land in some countries, as rural inhabitants are 
forced ever farther from home in search of needed fuel. Logging is 
also responsible for much land clearing and is a major export 
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industry in some countries. Land clearing for agriculture and 
ranching is also a major contributor as increasing populations 
expand into more marginal lands. 
At the root of many of these causes is the increasing 
population pressure resulting from growth rates as high as 4%. 
Table 2 shows current and projected population/land ratios for 
selected African countries. It should be noted that these figures 
are based on the area of arable land which is considerably less 
than the total. The trend in the figures indicates the potential 
for severe problems in the future, while at the same time it is 
clear that there is considerable local variation. In addition to 
limited availability in some areas, many African soils are of 
relatively poor quality, though African farmers use less fertilizer 
than their counterparts anywhere else in the world, as illustrated 
by Table 3. 2 
From an economic point of view, the most important result of 
environmental degradation is the loss of productive capacity. That 
is, the land loses its ability to provide a viable subsistence for 
the people who rely on it. Population pressure can have a direct 
effect on this productive capacity if excessive cUltivation 
prevents regeneration of nutrients or causes direct damage through 
erosion or other means. For example, continued use of farming 
systems based on slash-and-burn methods can result in severe damage 
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if population densities rise to a point where the forest no longer 
remains fallow for a long enough period between cultivations. 3 
While new farming techniques could in theory help a great deal, the 
introduction of new technologies in traditional societies is a slow 
process, often much slower than the pace of land degradation. 
These problems are likely to remain an obstacle for the 
foreseeable future. African economies are for the most part 
dependent on agriculture for a major portion of GNP and for the 
employment of the majority of the labor force. Thus, overall 
growth will almost inevitably involve agricUltural growth, 
particularly in export crops, as a result of efforts to open 
economies and increase trade. Given the fact that two thirds of 
the increase in agricultural output over the past decade has been 
a result of increases in the area cultivated rather than in the 
yield obtained, it is likely that future growth will be based at 
least partly on continued expansion into previously uncultivated 
4areas.
The remainder of the paper will discuss the ability of DNS's 
to help ameliorate these problems. First, the details of the swap 
transactions themselves will be discussed together with a brief 
review of previous DNS' s. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages for each of the participants. The 
paper will end with an evaluation of the prospects for swaps in 
Africa and recommendations for the future. 
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Previous Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
Debt-for-nature swaps are similar to debt-for-equity swaps, 
which have been conducted since 1982. There are three principal 
participants in any debt swap: 
1. Creditor banks - In order for a debt swap to occur, a creditor 
must be willing to sell the debt instruments owed by the country of 
interest. 
2. Foreign investors - In a debt-for-equity swap, these are foreign 
nationals who wish to invest directly or in the stock market of the 
country whose debt is purchased. In a debt-for-nature swap they 
are foreign environmental groups who wish to promote environmental 
expenditures or actions. 
3. Central Bank - In order for the foreign investors to make 
investments domestically, they must be able to convert the "second­
hand debt" into local currency at the Central Bank. Unless the 
government is willing to make such a conversion there is no reason 
to purchase outstanding debt obligations. 
The first step in a swap transaction is for the foreign 
investors or environmental groups to purchase the foreign debt on 
the secondary market. The extent of the advantage that can be 
gained from this purchase is limited by the size of the discount at 
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which the debt can be purchased. This discount, typically reported 
as a percentage of face value, is the main reason for the existence 
of a secondary market in developing country debt. 
This market arose in 1982 as a result of the LDC debt crisis 
which caused widespread uncertainty about the ability of debtor 
nations to pay foreign currency obligations. This doubt as to the 
quality of the debt meant that the instruments themselves - the 
"IOU's" - were not worth as much as their face-value. Banks who 
wished to rid their portfolios of bad debt, and who were willing to 
take the loss incurred by selling at a discount, provided the 
supply of debt to the secondary market. 
So, the result of the first step is an exchange of hard 
currency for the discounted debt obligation of the developing 
country. The foreign investor must then take this debt instrument 
to the Central Bank of the country involved and exchange it for 
local currency. As a result of this second step, the foreign 
investor ends up with local means of payment while the debtor 
government can cancel the debt for which it was swapped. 
It is important to note that at this step there are two 
additional factors which determine the extent of the gain from 
using the debt swap mechanism. First is the discount at which the 
debt is redeemed. If the central bank redeems the debt at face 
value, then the foreign investors benefit to the extent of the 
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discount they received upon original purchase of the debt. To the 
extent that the local authorities themselves redeem at a discount, 
they can limit the implicit sUbsidy to the foreign investors. An 
additional way to limit the subsidy is to exchange the proceeds of 
the swap for local currency at an official exchange rate less 
favorable to the foreign transactors than a market determined rate. 
Such overvaluation is quite common in developing countries and has 
been a factor in several debt-for-nature swaps. 
Since the overall object of the transaction is to translate a 
given amount of hard currency into the greatest possible amount of 
local currency in the country of interest, the extent of the 
advantage gained by using the swap mechanism can be expressed in 
terms of the implicit exchange rate involved in the transaction. 
That is, the gain from a debt swap boils down to a preferential 
exchange rate which depends on the purchase value, the redemption 
value and the official exchange rate at which the swap is 
transacted. The following equation, where e represents the 
exchange rate and redemption and purchase values are expressed as 
a percent of face value, shows the relationships between these 
factors: 
(1)	 e impl icit = redemption value x eofficial
 purchase value
 
This equation shows that the implicit exchange rate (expressed 
as local currency/$) improves with increases in the purchase 
discount, but decreases with higher redemption discounts or more 
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overvalued official exchange rates. The extent to which this 
funding mechanism provides an advantage can be further limited by 
restrictions on the uses to which the proceeds can be applied. For 
example, some DNS I S have been used to fund environmental bonds 
which have had interest rates fixed below the rate of inflation. 
This can result in a capital loss in terms of the initial 
investment, as in Costa Rica where swaps were used to fund bond 
issues with fixed interest rates of 15% and 25%. 
other uses of the proceeds have been the creation of national 
parks or reserves, as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, the 
Philippines and Madagascar. Funds for management of parks and for 
creation or financing of domestic environmental groups have also 
been provided via swaps. In the most recent transaction in 
Madagascar some of the proceeds were dedicated to research into the 
problems of deforestation afflicting large parts of the island. 
Table 4 summarizes debt-for-nature transactions which have 
occurred to date, aggregating individual swaps into country totals. 
The table makes it clear that there has been considerable variation 
in the discounts and exchange rates involved, while at the same 
time it can be seen that the amounts of debt swapped have 
represented only a small fraction of total foreign debt 
outstanding. The World wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy and 
Conservation International are three environmental groups which 
have played a key role in promoting and funding many of these 
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transactions. Both the Dutch and Swedish governments have been 
involved in Costa Rica. 
All of these swaps have several aspects in common: all have 
resulted in the cancellation of some foreign debt; all have 
resulted in the creation or support of parks; most have resulted in 
additional funding for local environmental groups. Only the first 
case, in Bolivia, provided for limitations on ownership rights to 
land, when constraints were placed on logging and agricultural 
development in buffer areas surrounding the Beni biosphere. Both 
Costa Rica and Ecuador made use of environmental bonds while the 
most recent transaction swapped foreign currency trade credits 
rather than syndicated bank debt as in previous examples. s 
In order to make an evaluation of the debt swap mechanism for 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the following sections will address the gains 
to each participant in the swap and the ability of these 
transactions to affect the debt and environmental problems of the 
region. 
Pros and Cons of Debt Swaps 
This section will consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
debt swaps for each of the three major participants, the creditor 
banks, foreign environmental groups, and the debtor countries. 
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Creditor Banks 
Debt-for-nature swaps (or indeed any kind of swap) are clearly 
good for creditor banks - they would not participate in them at all 
if they thought otherwise. To sell debt instruments at a discount 
means that the banks value these obligations no higher (and perhaps 
lower) than the price at which they are sold. If the creditor 
banks had no fears about timely repayment, they would not be 
selling the debt at all. They are selling questionable paper in 
return for cash from environmental groups, transactions which when 
viewed ex-post have virtually always been beneficial in light of 
the downward trend in secondary market prices for debt through the 
1980s. 
It is important to note that the number of banks which can or 
will participate in the secondary market for LDC debt is limited. 
This is due to accounting regulations which require banks which 
have sold developing country debt at a discount to "mark to market" 
any similar debt remaining on their books. In other words, to sell 
at a discount is to admit to impaired value and once this is 
admitted, banks are required to subtract the implied loss from 
their profits. For banks which hold large amounts of developing 
country debt, the resulting writedown could impose huge losses and 
result in the elimination of a significant portion of bank capital, 
a situation in whch most money center banks find themselves. 
Consequently, banks with too much exposure to take the loss stay 
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out of the market, which is supplied mainly by smaller regional 
banks seeking to exit the market for developing country debt 
entirely. It has been estimated that only eight banks account for 
approximately 85% of the volume in the secondary market for debt. 6 
It is also important to note that there are relatively few 
African countries with commercial bank debt available to be swapped 
since, without a supply of debt, the transaction cannot go forward. 
(See Table 5). While the use of trade credits in the Madagascar 
swap sets a precedent that could be applied much more widely, the 
fact that trade credits (Which support the international trade in 
merchandise - the main revenue source for many governments) are 
considered to be questionable debts is evidence of a very 
unfavorable economic situation. Sale of these credits at a 
discount makes it more difficult and/or expensive to use this 
source subsequently. Difficulty in obtaining such credits could 
pose very real obstacles to every-day transactions whose 
interruption could cause major economic damage. 
The fact that a large majority of African countries owe money 
to the World Bank and the IMF is no help in terms of supply for the 
secondary debt market. Obligations to these international 
organizations are not resalable - even if they were considered of 
dubious enough quality to sell at a discount. In fact, these two 
organizations have senior creditor status, meaning that they are 
the first in line to be repaid in the event that there are 
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insufficient funds to satisfy all creditors. This senior status 
means that this debt enjoys a far higher likelihood of being repaid 
than does other debt and so would be unlikely to sell at a 
discount. The World Bank in particular has been reluctant to admit 
to impaired value in its loan portfolio, and will go to great 
lengths to preserve the AAA credit rating which allows it to borrow 
on world capital markets at the best available rates. Bilateral 
creditors can participate as did the Dutch and Swedes in Costa 
Rica, but this has been limited to these examples so far. 
Environmental Groups 
The degree to which environmental groups can magnify available 
funds via a debt swap depends mainly on the factors discussed above 
in equation (1). To the extent that there is in fact a greater 
expenditure for environmental purposes than there would be 
otherwise, debt swaps provide an advantage. However, it is 
important to realize that this depends on the additionality of the 
funds; i.e. the extent to which the debt swap results in 
expenditures that would not otherwise have taken place. 
While it is clear that environmental expenditures result, it 
is less clear that they are 100% additional. For example, a direct 
donation of hard currency would also result in environmental 
expenditures, if we take it as given that environmental groups have 
a certain amount of money that they can dedicate to this purpose. 
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How much additionality results from a swap depends a great deal on 
the extent to which donor priorities coincide with those of the 
debtor government. To the extent that donations or debt swaps 
merely replace expenditures that governments would have made 
anyway, the degree of additionality is diminished. 
Perhaps the biggest plus for environmental groups is the 
extensive pUblicity and pUblic awareness that can result from these 
transactions. While it is difficult to measure the value of this, 
it is clear that increased international attention to environmental 
problems can help prod governments into action. 
Debtor Countries 
It would seem obvious that one direct benefit of debt swaps is 
the reduction in the amount of foreign debt outstanding. However, 
before jumping to this conclusion it is important to bear two 
caveats in mind: 
1. The amounts involved are small. Table 4 shows that debt swaps 
have resulted in the cancellation of a very small portion of 
outstanding debt, amounting to less than 2% even in the country 
with the largest program, Costa Rica. 
13
 
2. Cancellation of outstanding debt is a benefit only if the debt 
would have been repaid. Put another way, tearing up an IOU is only 
a help if the IOU was worth something in the first place. 
Clearly, the creditor banks have a low opinion of the value of 
the debt or, as noted above, they wouldn't sell it in the first 
place. It can still be argued that cancellation of the debt 
reduces the debt service owed in any given year, regardless of the 
ultimate disposition of the debt. However, a closer look at actual 
debt repayments shows that the amount repaid in any given year 
bears little relation to the amount contractually required. 
Rather, repayment levels in the years since 1982 have been 
determined by negotiation based on a country's ability to pay. 
This ability is conditioned by such factors as GNP growth and 
achievement of a positive trade balance - variations in prices of 
important export commodities have been far more important than the 
face value of outstanding debt. 7 
In sum, incremental reductions in total debt outstanding have 
little or no real effect on a country's current position. If one 
is of the opinion that attempts to repay the debt are likely to be 
unsuccessful anyway and that it will eventually be repudiated or 
forgiven, then canceling it now in exchange for cash is in fact a 
loss to the debtor governments. 
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It may seem somewhat paradoxical to argue that the debt swap 
results in no net addition to the resources available to the debtor 
country. However, this paradox in resolved if we consider the 
ultimate destination of the hard currency with which environmental 
groups initiated the transaction - This money goes to the creditors 
and not to the debtor government, to whom it would in fact 
represent an increase in the ability to command resources. The 
money that is spent on environmental projects is local currency 
whose issue does not represent additional resources to the debtor 
country. 
Additional issue of local currency cannot result in additional 
wealth unless one is willing to argue that the money mUltiplier in 
Sub-Saharan African economies is positive; that is, that printing 
money will result in more output rather than more inflation. This 
is not a very sound argument in most cases, leaving reallocation of 
existing priorities as the only source of additionality to 
environmental expenditures. That is, such funding comes at the 
expense of other priorities in what amounts to a zero sum game. 
Whether or not those expenditures which are eliminated are more or 
less important than those which receive additional funds depends on 
one's point of view. As noted above, the desirability of the end 
result depends on the degree to which the priorities of the 
government coincide with those of the environmental groups. 
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When weighing the extent of these beneficial aspects for the 
debtor countries, it is also necessary to account for the costs 
that are incurred in sUbsidizing the swap. This subsidy is a 
mirror image of the advantage accruing to the environmental groups 
as a result of the favorable implicit exchange rate shown in 
equation (1). To the extent that the debtor government permits the 
parties to the swap to "leverage" their money via the swap 
mechanism, it is itself providing the additional value. Some 
countries have made an effort to limit the extent of the sUbsidy. 
For example, Costa Rica originally redeemed debt at 70% of face 
value but reduced this to 35% after secondary market prices for 
Costa Rican obligations declined. 8 
The value of any development rights foregone, as in the 
Bolivian swap, must also be counted as part of the cost of a swap. 
Though difficult to quantify, these costs can be sUbstantial. 
Finally, the administrative and legal costs of arranging such 
complex transactions are not negligible and must be borne to some 
extent by all parties to the transaction. 
Ultimately, no evaluation of debt-for-nature transactions is 
complete without an examination of the end uses of the funds and 
the ability of these uses to have a favorable impact on the 
environmental problems of the region. This is the sUbject of the 
next section. 
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Parks, Preserves and Local Environmental Groups 
Every country which has had a debt-for-nature swap program has 
used a large share of the funds to create or support parks or 
nature preserves. Can creating parks address the widespread 
ecological problems afflicting Sub-Saharan Africa? 
In cases where specific areas which provide important habitats 
or which contain significant biodiversity can be protected, it 
seems clear that parks can help, provided that there is adequate 
enforcement and management. This, however, is an important caveat. 
Table 6 shows that Sub-Saharan African countries already have 165 
national parks, most of which are sited so as to preserve the most 
important habitats. The existence of these parks has not prevented 
various important species from becoming extinct in some countries 
(rhinos, for example), largely because of an inability to enforce 
regulations. Table 7 shows recurrent costs for several African 
parks. It is clear from the variation in the figures that many 
parks are underfunded; spreading available funds and resources over 
larger areas may hurt more than it can help. 
It is at least worth considering whether creating additional 
parks on top of the 165 which already exist can make a significant 
contribution. It is likely that in some cases such as the recent 
swap in Madagascar, the answer is yes. This is particularly true 
in countries which derive significant income from eco-tourism, such 
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as Kenya. However, it is an open question whether widespread 
application of this principle across the remainder of the continent 
is worthwhile. In any case, creation of parks can do little to 
address the broader problems of poverty and overpopulation which 
underlie much of the pressure on fragile lands. 
Addressing these problems will take time and money. The 
results will be incremental, and often much less pleasant to visit 
than nature preserves or natural parks. 9 However, there is one 
major form of assistance which can be given: Cancel the foreign 
debt of African countries. Recognition that this debt cannot be 
repaid and that continued attempts to do so exacerbate the poverty 
which promotes environmental destruction is very important. 
Perhaps one of the biggest drawbacks of debt swaps is their 
implicit acceptance of the legitimacy of the need to repay. 
Cancellation of the debt is, however, a political rather than 
economic decision. Until such time as it is achieved, either as a 
matter of policy or as a result of the inability of countries to 
repay, those with money to spend on the environment in developing 
countries should give this money to these countries directly rather 
than giving it to creditor banks. 
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NOTES
 
1.	 See New York Times August 28, 1990 p. c4. 
2.	 This difference is becoming still more pronounced as the 
financial crises in which many countries find themselves 
prevent expenditure of scarce foreign exchange on imported 
fertilizer. In addition, both the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund promote elimination of subsidies 
on purchased inputs such as fertilizer as part of broader 
structural adjustment and stabilization packages. 
3.	 This is precisely the problem underlying much of the 
deforestation in Madagascar. 
4.	 This statement is based on information contained in the FAO 
Production Yearbook. 
5.	 See Kyle & Hawkins (1989) and Occhiolini (1990) for additional 
details on each transaction. 
6.	 See Blackwell & Nocera (1988). 
7.	 See Lindert (1989) and Sachs (1989) for extensive documen­
tation on this point. 
8.	 See Occhiolini (1990). 
9.	 The penchant of environmentalists in developed countries for 
such visible and tangible results as nature preserves is 
actually quite consistent with the historical tendency of rich 
countries to fund large "showcase" projects in developing 
countries. Donors in rich countries, whether environmentalist 
or interested in industrial development, may have more in 
common than they realize. 
19
 
REFERENCES
 
Blackwell, M. & S. Nocera, "Debt/Equity Swaps" IMF Working Paper 
WP/88/1S, 1988. 
Food and Agriculture Organization, Fertilizer Yearbook, Rome 1986. 
Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook, Rome 
various issues. 
Kyle, S. & A. Hawkins, "Financing Environmental Expenditures in 
Africa" in Lassoie & Kyle eds. Policy Reform and Natural 
Resources Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Cornell Natural 
Resources Research and Extension Series No. 34, September 
1989. 
Lassoie, J. & W. Wischusen, "The Impact of Structural Adjustment 
Programs on wildlife in Sub-Saharan Africa l1 in Lassoie & Kyle 
eds. Policy Reform and Natural Resources Management in sub­
Saharan Africa, Cornell Natural Resources Research and 
Extension Series No. 34, September 1989. 
Lele, u. & S. Stone, "Population Pressure, the Environment, and 
Agricultural Intensification: Variations on the Boserup 
Hypothesis" MADIA Discussion Paper No.4, World Bank 1990. 
Lindert, P, "Response to Debt Crisis: What is Different About the 
1980's?" Ch. 8 in Eichengreen & Lindert eds. The International 
Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective MIT Press 1989. 
Occhiolini, M I1Debt-for-Nature Swapsl1 World Bank International 
Economics Department Working Paper #WPS 393, March 1990. 
New York Times, August 28,1990. 
Sachs, J, (ed) Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, 
University of Chicago Press 1989. 
20
 
Table 1. Wildlife Habitat Loss in Sub-Saharan African Countries in 1986. 
Country 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
C.A.R. 
Chad 
Congo 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Equitoria1 Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
TOTAL 
Original Wildlife
 
Habitat (km2 )
 
1,246,700 
115,800 
585,400 
273,800 
25,700 
469,400 
623,000 
720,800 
342,000 
318,000 
21,800 
26,000 
1,101,003 
267,000 
11,300 
230,000 
245,900 
36,100 
569,500 
30,400 
111,400 
595,211 
94,100 
754,100 
388,600 
783,203 
832,200 
566,000 
919,800 
25,100 
196,200 
71,700 
637,700 
1,236,500 
1,703,000 
17,400 
886,200 
56,000 
193,700 
2,335,900 
752,600 
390,200 
20,797,441 
Amount Remaining Percent 
(km2 ) Change 
760,847 39 
46,320 60 
257,576 56 
54,760 80 
3,598 86 
192,454 59 
274,120 56 
172,992 76 
174,420 49 
66,780 79 
11,118 49 
12,740 51 
30,300 70 
173,550 35 
1,243 89 
46,000 80 
73,770 70 
7,942 78 
296,140 48 
9,728 68 
14,482 87 
148,803 75 
40,463 57 
158,361 79 
73,834 81 
367,760 57 
444,528 46 
127,880 77 
229,950 75 
3,263 87 
35,316 82 
10,755 85 
376,243 41 
531,695 57 
510,900 70 
7,656 56 
505,134 43 
19,040 66 
42,614 78 
1,051,155 55 
534,346 29 
171,688 46 
8,340,920 65 
Source: Lassoie and Wischusen, 1989. 
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Table 2. Actual and Projected Per Capita Arable Land in Selected Countries. 
Country Year 
1985 2000 
------hectare per person-----­
Kenya 0.73 0.42 
Malawi 0.48 0.30 
Tanzania 2.30 1.44 
Cameroon 3.34 2.09 
Nigeria 0.71 0.48 
Senegal 0.70 0.45 
Source: Lele and Stone, 1990. 
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Table 3. Fertilizer Use Per Hectare of Arable Land, 1975 and 1985. 
Region Kg. of Nutrient/Ha
 
1975 1985
 
Africa 13 20
 
Latin America 29 41
 
Oceanic 29 32
 
Developing Countries 27 58
 
Asia 37 85
 
North America 87 85
 
Western Europe 188 228
 
World 63 87
 
Source: FAD, Fertilizer Yearbook, 1986. 
• 
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Table 4. Debt-For-Nature Transactions. 
Country Cost Face-Value Local Currency Total Foreign Debt 
Bolivia $ 100,000 $650,000 $250,000 $ 4.5 billion 
Ecuador 1,422,750 10,000,000 10,000,000 9.4 billion 
Costa Rica 10,175,000 68,500,000 33,730,000 3.5 billion 
Philippines 200,000 390,000 390,000 23.5 billion 
Madagascar n.a. 5,000,000 5,000,000 3.3 billion 
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Table 5. Sub-Saharan Countries with External Commercial Debt 
Quoted on the Secondary Market. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sudan 
Togo 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Source: Blackwell and Nocera, 1988. 
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Table 6. Number and Area of National Parks in Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
Number Park Total 
Country of Parks Area (km2 ) Area (k.rn2 ) Percent 
Angola 6 54,660 1,246,694 4.38 
Benin 2 8,435 112,622 7.49 
Botswana 3 37,370 574,978 6.50 
Burkina Faso 2 3,905 274,200 1.42 
Burundi 0 0 27,731 0.00 
Cameroon 6 9,059 465,054 1. 95 
Car 3 29,800 622,996 4.78 
Chad 2 4,140 1,270,994 0.33 
Comoros 0 0 2,274 0.00 
Congo 1 1,266 342,000 0.37 
Cote d' Ivoire 7 17,570 322,462 5.45 
Djibouti 1 ? 21,699 
Equitoria1 Guinea 0 0 28,051 0.00 
Ethiopia 8 11,675 1,184,000 0.99 
Gabon 1 3,580 267,667 1. 34 
Gambia 1 6 10,368 0.06 
Ghana 5 11,303 238,538 4.74 
Guinea 1 ? 245,855 
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 36,125 0.00 
Kenya 16 25,844 582,600 4.44 
Lesotho 1 69 30,344 0.22 
Liberia 2 3,607 111,370 3.24 
Madagascar 2 997 587,042 0.17 
Malawi 6 7,073 94,276 7.50 
Mali 1 3,500 1,204,022 0.29 
Mauritania 1 11,730 1,118,604 1. 05 
Mauritius 0 0 1,843 0.00 
Mozambique 4 15,900 784,961 2.03 
Namibia 1 22,270 824,293 2.70 
Niger 1 2,200 1,267,000 0.17 
Nigeria 1 5,341 923,769 0.58 
Reunion 0 0 2,510 0.00 
Rwanda 2 2,620 26,338 9.95 
Sao Tome 0 0 964 0.00 
Senegal 6 10,095 197,160 5.12 
Seychelles 2 37 444 8.38 
Sierra Leone 1 980 72,326 1. 35 
Somalia 0 0 637,539 0.00 
South Africa 9 29,718 1,225,100 2.43 
St. Helena 0 0 122 0.00 
Sudan 4 44,819 2,505,813 1. 79 
Swaziland 0 0 17,366 0.00 
Tanzania 10 37,518 930,700 4.03 
Togo 2 3;620 56,500 6.41 
Uganda 4 7,698 236,036 3.26 
Zaire 8 122,000 2,345,236 5.20 
Zambia 19 63,590 752,617 8.45 
Zimbabwe 13 33,759 389,361 8.67 
TOTAL 165 647,754 24,220,564 2.77 
Source: Lassoie and Wischusen, 1987. 
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Table 7. Recurrent Cost Expenditures and Densities of Staff for Wildlife 
Management and Protection in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
Country 1984 Expenditures km2!staff 
U.S. $/km2 1984 1987 Percent Change 
Botswana 10 577 .5 
C.A.R. 8 329.5 680 106 
Ethiopia 57 77 .2 
Ghana 8.7 
Kenya 188 20.0 
Malawi 45 45.8 57 24 
Mozambique 19 100.4 1133 1028 
Niger 292.4 3400 1063 
Rwanda 21.7 
Somalia 50 14.7 
South Africa 206 41.0 4 -90 
Tanzania 20 273.2 109 -60 
Uganda 357 7.2 
Zambia 11 299.7 
Zimbabwe 277 21. 9 34 55 
Source: Lassoie and Wischusen, 1989. 
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